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LLerena Garrés, Francesc
Associate Professor
Specialization Game theory, Assignment markets
e-mail francesc.llerena@urv.cat
Phone 977759835
Office D109
Group grode

On manipulability in financial systems

Year: 2021

Reference: Document de treball n.09

Author(s): Calleja, P. , Francesc LLerena Garrés and Sudhölter, P.

Electronic edition: ISSN 2696-5097

Weak fairness and the Shapley value

Year: 2018

Reference: Document de treball n.10-2018

Author(s): Pedro Calleja and Francesc LLerena Garrés

Paper edition: ISSN 1576-3382

Electronic edition: ISSN 1988-0820

Consistency distinguishes the (weighted) Shapley value, the (weighted) surplus division value and the prenucleolus

Year: 2016

Reference: Document de treball n.18- 2016

Author(s): Pedro Calleja and Francesc LLerena Garrés

Paper edition: ISSN 1576-3382

Electronic edition: ISSN 1988-0820

On the existence of the Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution

Year: 2016

Reference: Document de treball n.14- 2016

Author(s): Francesc LLerena Garrés and Llúcia Mauri

Paper edition: ISSN 1576-3382

Electronic edition: ISSN 1988-0820

On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games

Year: 2015

Reference: Document de treball n.12-2015

Author(s): Pedro Calleja and Francesc LLerena Garrés

Paper edition: ISSN 1576-3382

Electronic edition: ISSN 1988-0820

Generalized three-sided assignment markets: consistency and the core

Year: 2014

Reference: Document de treball n.28-2014

Author(s): Ata Atay , Francesc LLerena Garrés and Marina Nuñez

Paper edition: ISSN 1576-3382

Electronic edition: ISSN 1988-0820

On reduced games and the lexmax solution

Year: 2014

Reference: Document de treball n.09-2014

Author(s): Francesc LLerena Garrés and Llúcia Mauri Masdeu

Paper edition: ISSN 1576-3382

Electronic edition: ISSN 1988-0820

A note on the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the imputation set

Year: 2014

Reference: Document de treball n.07-2014

Author(s): Francesc LLerena Garrés and Llúcia Mauri Masdeu

Paper edition: ISSN 1576-3382

Electronic edition: ISSN 1988-0820

Axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment games

Reference: Document de treball n.06-2014

Author(s): Francesc LLerena Garrés , Marina Núñez and Carles Rafels

Paper edition: ISSN 1576-3382

Electronic edition: ISSN 1988-0820

The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core

Year: 2013

Reference: Document de treball n.15 - 2013

Author(s): Francesc LLerena Garrés and Cori Vilella Bach

Paper edition: ISSN 1576-3382

Electronic edition: ISSN 1988-0820

An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution

Year: 2012

Reference: Document de treball n.16 - 2012

Author(s): Francesc LLerena Garrés and Cori Vilella Bach

Paper edition: ISSN 1576-3382

Electronic edition: ISSN 1988-0820