| Manipulability, unanimity,
anonymity and merging functions | Social Choice
and Welfare 17(3) 481-516 |
| On expressing maximum information in extensive games | Mathematical
Social Sciences 42(2) 161-167 |
| The normal form is not sufficient | Economics
and Philosophy 17(2) 235-243 |
| On the existence of self-enforcing equilibria | Economics Bulletin 3(5) 1-5 |
| More on independent decisiveness and Arrow’s theorem | Social Choice
and Welfare 19(2) 449-454 |
| Another impossibility result for normal form games | Theory and Decision 52(1) 73-80 |
| Power of enforcement and dictatorship | Theory and Decision 52(4) 381-387 |
| Belief system foundations of backward induction | Theory and Decision 53(4) 393-403 |
| Preference profiles sustaining Arrow’s theorem | Economic Theory 20(3) 623-627 |
| A conflict between sequential rationality and consistency principles | International
Journal of Game Theory 31(1) 13-18 |
| Elasticity and revenue: a reappraisal | Economics Bulletin 4(13) 1-5 |
| From social choice functions to dictatorial social welfare functions | Economics Bulletin 4(16) 1-7 |
| Positional independence in preference aggregation | Social Choice
and Welfare 20(3) 363-370 |
| Dictatorial voting operators | Review
of Economic Design 8(3) 347-358 |
| (100 - 200/m)% veto power | Research in
Economics 57(2) 83-92 |
| From common knowledge of rationality to backward induction | International
Game Theory Review 5(2) 127-137 |
| Negative results in the theory of games with lexicographic utilities | Economics Bulletin 3(20) 1-7 |
| Abstention as an escape from Arrow's theorem | Social Choice
and Welfare 2(5) 221-226 |
| Selling a vote | European
Journal of Political Economy 21(1) 73-82 |
| A positional version of Arrow's theorem | Journal of Mathematical Economics 41(8) 1053-1059 |
| Hierarchical allocation | Economics
Letters 91(1) 98-103 |
| 1 dictator = 2 voters | Public Choice 130(3-4) 395-400 |
| Merging discrete evaluations | Mathematical
Social Sciences 54(1) 25-34 |
| Up/downward preference aggregation | Journal of Public Economic Theory 11(5) 857-873 |
| Monotonicity and the Hirsch index | Journal
of Informetrics 3(2) 158-160 |
| More axiomatics for the Hirsch index | Scientometrics 82(2) 413-418 |
| Monotonicity + efficiency + continuity = majority | Mathematical
Social Sciences 60(2) 149-154 |
| Two axioms for the majority rule | Economics Bulletin 30(4) 3033-3037 |
| Further characterizations of the Hirsch index | Scientometrics 87(1) 107-114 |
| Axiomatics for the Hirsch index and the Egghe index | Journal
of Informetrics 5(3) 476-480 |
| Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity | Economics
Letters 111(2) 151-154 |
| Unconcerned groups and the majority rule | Economics Bulletin 31(2) 1757-1764 |
| A short step between democracy and dictatorship | Theory and Decision 72(2) 149-166 |
| Unanimous, reducible, anonymous social choice |
Economics Bulletin 32(1) 242-250 |
| The majority rule with a chairman |
Social Choice
and Welfare 40(3) 679-691 |
| The majority rule with arbitrators | Group Decision and Negotiation 22(2) 321-330 |
| To majority through the search for unanimity | Journal of Public Economic Theory 15(5) 729–735 |
| Taking alleged dictatorship more seriously: Rejoinder to Fried |
Public Choice 158(1) 253-259 |